As a minor footnote to the past few posts on the Introduction to Christianity, I should note that the Ratzinger of 1968 does not know Aristotle well. For example, he says on page 160:
Greek thought always regarded the many individual creatures, including the many individual human beings, only as individuals, arising out of the splitting up of the idea in matter. The reproductions are thus always secondary; the real thing is the one and universal. The Christian sees in man, not an individual, but a person; and it seems to me that this passage from individual to person contains the whole span of the transition from antiquity to Christianity, from Platonism to faith.
That the universal is more real is in fact a platonic notion, but Aristotle–surely to be included in “Greek thought”–emphatically denied this. He said that the individual is more real. To be fair, Aristotle did not dominate antiquity as Plato did, but given the major role his philosophy played in Boethius and in all of medieval theology, one would expect that he would get an honorable mention as an important thinker of antiquity.
At another point, on page 174, Ratzinger argues that one must approach a mystery by putting together statements that seem irreconcilable to reason but in fact are complementary:
The intellectual approach of modern physics may offer us more help here than Aristotelian philosophy was able to give. Physicists know today that one can only talk about the structure of matter by approaching the subject from various angles. They know that the position of the observer at any one time affects the results of his investigation of nature. Why should we not be able to understand afresh, on this basis, that in the question of God we must not look, in the Aristotelian fashion, for an ultimate concept emcompassing the whole but must be prepared to find a multitude of aspects that depend on the position of the observer and that we can no longer survey as a whole but only accept alongside each other, without being able to say the final word on the subject? We meet here the hidden interplay of faith and modern thought. That present-day physicists are stepping outside the structure of Aristotelian logic and thinking in this way is surely an effect already of the new dimension that Christian theology has opened up, of its need to think in “complementarities”.
Aristotle does in fact, in subtle ways, approach difficult realities from various angles, and in fact he gives an explicit account of why matter is difficult to know. But Thomas Aquinas offers an even clearer example of a pre-modern, Aristotelian theologian who already grasped this insight Ratzinger finds in modern physics. For example, in his discussion of the union of divinity and humanity in Christ in chapter 11 of his Compendium, Aquinas explicitly says that we cannot find an all-encompassing explanation because this mystery exceeds reason, and then he goes on to lay out two seemingly opposed but in fact complementary ways to understand it. It’s the exact procedure Ratzinger lays out.
More on this point soon.
January 26, 2010 at 1:59 pm
Jeremy,
Can you point me to the place where Aristotle said that the individual is
more real than the universal?
Papa
January 26, 2010 at 3:58 pm
I think right away of the first sentence of the fifth chapter of Aristotle’s Categories. I know I have seen other texts where Aristotle disagrees with Plato’s theory of ideas, but they are not as fresh in my mind. I taught through the Categories just this past semester, so that is still fresh.
January 26, 2010 at 4:50 pm
I looked up the first sentence of the fifth chapter of the Categories and did not see where Aristotle said that the individual is more real than the universal. I realize that Aristotle criticized Plato’s theory of ideas, but I did not think it was on that ground. I have always thought that for Aristotle the important thing was to know what a thing is, i.e., its definition, which is a knowledge of a universal; and that the particularities that distinguish this instance of one of these from another of one of these was not an object of science and not important.
January 26, 2010 at 7:07 pm
In that passage of the Categories, he says that individuals are substances in the fullest sense. Universals are substances only in a secondary sense.
Plato, I think, would have said the reverse: universal man is more man, and more substance, than the individual who partakes of the universal. On his account, the individual would be substance in a secondary sense.
About what Aristotle saw as important, I think it true to say that he thought science (in his sense of that word) was possible of universals and not of particulars. But I don’t think that is the same as saying he thought the universals more real. The universals, as universals, exist only in our heads; what exists outside our heads is the real world.
Does this make sense of that passage in the Categories? I can ask around to find other passages if that would be helpful.
January 26, 2010 at 7:19 pm
Oh, I forgot to mention that later in chapter 5 of the Categories Aristotle says more about this subject. He emphasizes that the closer one gets to the particular, the more truly applicable the name “substance” is. He goes so far as to say that if particulars didn’t exist, then the universal would not exist either–which is not something Plato would say, I don’t think. Here is the text:
January 27, 2010 at 4:01 am
I think I am following. You are equating being a substance with being more real. I am thinking of what Aristotle thinks is scientifically knowable and therefore important. I am not still not sure that Ratzinger was in error when he talked about the transition from Greek thought to Christianity as being marked by a passage from the individual to the person.
January 27, 2010 at 5:38 am
“Important” is a term that might need clarification. In some sense, Aristotle does think it more important to attend to universals, and it’s a pretty important sense of important because Aristotle sees knowing as man’s highest activity. At the same time, he thinks that universals as universals do not exist outside the mind, and that the real world outside the mind consists entirely of particulars, without whom there would be no universals to think on. From this point of view, one would say that he thinks individuals are important. I guess it depends on how one defines the terms.
April 17, 2011 at 2:23 pm
Just became aware of this blog through Dr. Seeley. I must say that there seems to be more wrong with the text of Fr. Ratzinger than is right with it. In addition to the defects pointed out in the blog posting, there is this: the Greeks recognized that form itself could be a principle of individuation, not that it could be the basis for multiplying individuals of the same species, but that it could differentiate individuals of different species. Thus, Anaxagoras saw that Mind was an individual not mixed with matter, Plato seems to multiply the Forms without the matter, his “nurse of becoming”, and Aristotle multiplies the separated intelligences. Second of all, the “idea” of matter is not “split up”, but matter itself is divided. Third, the quotation “The Christian sees in man, not an individual, but a person” is absurd — like saying the Christian sees in a dog not an organism, but an animal. A person IS an individual, more fully, an individual substance of a rational nature. Sure, some modern theologians prefer to define “person” without recourse to “individual” or “substance”, but that is not because they are Christian, but because they are modern. Boethius and the scholastics were certainly Christian, and saw person as an enrichment upon the idea of individual substance.
January 2, 2011 at 10:23 am
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April 17, 2011 at 4:28 am
I think it is important not to confuse form with universal. Forms exist individually, for each is the form of a particular substance.